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This paper explores the micro-foundations of the trade-conflict nexus. We focus on the reduction of 
tariffs on agricultural imports from South countries to North countries as resulting from Preferential 
Trade Agreements. We combine the variation in agricultural tariffs over time with differences in crop 
suitability across districts within South countries. Our analysis covers 27 South countries and all their 
PTAs signed with major North countries between 1995 and 2014. Our approach rests upon the 
observation that differences in agro-climatic conditions within the country generate exogenous variation 
in suitability to produce different crops. Using 9km x 9km cells as unit of observations, we test if the 
North-South trade liberalization agreement affect levels of political violence and instability 
differentially in those districts that are more suitable to produce liberalized crops. We find robust 
evidence that in those cells, PTAs increase economic output and political violence, in line with the 
rapacity effect mechanism. 
Keywords 
Political violence, trade, agriculture, preferential trade agreement. 
JEL-Classification: D22, D24, F51, N45, O12 
 
Introduction1
Does trade liberalization affect internal political violence? Theory suggests two op-
posite effects (Becker 1968, Grossman 1991). On the one hand, if trade openness
increases average income, the opportunity cost of engaging in violence increases ac-
cordingly, decreasing the supply of internal conflict (so called opportunity cost effect).
On the other hand, if trade liberalization produces a rise in contestable income, violence
may increase as gains from appropriation are higher (so called rapacity effect).
Existing empirical evidence has produced mixed results. Several studies have find ev-
idence consistent with the opportunity cost effect (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
2004, Bruckner and Ciccone 2010; Dube and Vargas 2013; Bazzi and Blattman 2014;
Blattman and Annan 2016; Amodio, Baccini, and Di Maio, 2020). However, other
studies have also find support for the rapacity effect (Dube and Vargas 2013; Mayer
and Thoenig, 2016; ). In short, the question of how trade liberalization affects internal
warfare remains largely unanswered.
This paper studies empirically the micro-foundations of the trade-conflict nexus. Pro-
viding sound evidence of the impact of trade liberalization is challenging for several
reasons. For one, trade liberalization policies are typically adopted within the frame-
work of national development strategies, and are therefore informed by the economic
and political environment. In particular, political stability is crucial in the design and
implementation of trade agreements. As a result, a reverse causal path exists, from
political violence to trade liberalization.
To overcome these challenges, we focus on the reduction of tariffs on agricultural im-
ports from South countries to North countries. As tariffs drop, South countries expe-
rience a positive demand shock that builds on their comparative advantage. We com-
bine variation in agricultural tariffs over time with differences in crop suitability across
districts within South countries. Our approach rests upon the observation that differ-
ences in agro-climatic conditions within the country generate exogenous variation in
suitability to produce different crops. Using 9km×9km cells as unit of observations,
we test if, as North-South trade liberalization is implemented, the levels of political
violence change differentially in those districts that are more suitable to produce lib-
eralized crops. Our analysis cover 27 South countries and all their PTAs signed with
major trading entities between 1995 and 2014.
1We thank Tim Büthe, Nikhar Gaikwad, Quan Li, Giovanni Maggi, Helen Milner, and Gerald Schnei-
der for comments on the paper. Jeff Sauer provided excellent research assistance. Amodio and Baccini
gratefully acknowledge the support of McGill Internal SSH Development Grants. Errors remain our own.
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To carry out this fine-grained empirical analysis, we combine data from several sources.
We use agro-climatic-based estimates of crop suitability at the sub-national level with
data on agricultural tariffs, deriving a time-varying measure of export exposure at the
cell level.2 Moreover, we use luminosity as a proxy of GDP, following recent contri-
butions in economics (Henderson et al 2012, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013,
Costinot and Donaldson 2017). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to as-
semble this extensive mass of micro-level data to analyze the trade-conflict nexus for a
relative large number of countries.
Our main results are two-fold. First, we find strong evidence that North-South PTAs
increase the economic output of cells with high crop suitability significantly more than
the economic output of cells with low crop suitability. The magnitude of the effect is
quite remarkable; in South countries, the economic output value would have been 2.2
percent lower in absence of the trade agreement with major trading entities. Second,
we find strong support for the rapacity effect. According to the estimates, the effects of
PTAs that we investigate account for an increase of 10 percent of the total number of
violent events in South countries in the period under investigation.
We contribute to the literature on the trade-conflict nexus along several dimensions.
First, while previous studies have mostly explored the effect of trade on inter-state con-
flict, our paper focuses on the impact of trade agreements on intra-state conflicts, which
has been largely overlooked by the previous literature. Second, focusing on preferential
liberalization allows us to bring governments preferences into the picture. In study-
ing the opportunity cost channel as a determinant of political violence, economists and
political scientists have traditionally focused on changes in international commodity
prices as shocks to economic activity. These are determined by the interaction of de-
mand and supply at the global level, with little role for government intervention. On
the contrary, trade agreements are policy tools on which governments have direct con-
trol. Therefore, our analysis provides clear policy implication useful to governments
implementing trade liberalization.
Third, from a policy point of view, our results are timely and important. To facilitate
trade, governments in both developed and developing countries have implemented a
large number of trade agreements. Our analysis shows that these policies are effec-
tive from a purely economic point of view. However, we demonstrate also that trade
agreements come with a dangerous side effect politically. Our findings should warn
politicians and policy-makers that trade liberalization may jeopardize political stabil-
2For recent papers using on crop suitability, see Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2018) and Bustos,
Caprettini and Ponticelli (2016); Costinot and Donaldson (2016).
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ity, exactly in those areas in which trade openness works the most. In this regard, our
research is in line with recent evidence from the US (Autor et al 2016).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys the literature
related to the trade-conflict nexus. Section presents the conceptual framework driving
the empirical analysis. Section describes the data. Section explains the empirical strat-
egy, while Section reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 0.2 concludes.
Literature Review
A rich body of economics and political science research has investigated the associa-
tion between economic conditions and political violence. There is large cross-country
evidence that low-income levels are associated with more conflict (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Justino 2009; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Buhaug et
al. 2011).3 Following the seminal paper by Miguel et al. (2004) several contributions
have documented the effect of economic shock on the incidence, onset and duration
of conflicts providing a strong support for the opportunity cost explanation of violence
(Hidalgo et al. 2010; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010).
One particularly important source of economic shocks is international trade. When
countries are open to trade, they are exposed to international prices variations. Several
studies have used the latter as a proxy for exogenous external income shocks (Besley
and Persson 2008; Bruckner and Ciccone 2010; Fearon 2005). In particular, most of the
studies test the theory that an increase in the value of export provides an incentive for
the onset of a civil war and makes its continuation possible (Collier and Hoefer 2007;
Collier, Hoefer and Rohner 2009). Cali and Mulabdic (2017) provides evidence cross-
country evidence that depending on the type of goods for which the price changes the
effect on conflict can be very different. McGuirk and Burke (2017) look in detail to the
different possible effects of changes in food prices on conflict in Africa distinguishing
between producer and consumer effects and between types of conflict. Their analysis
document a high degree of heterogeneity in the relationship between food prices and
conflict: the effect vary with the type of actor and the type and form of conflict.
While the evidence of an effect of export prices on conflict is weak at the cross-country
3While we do not discuss it here, there is similarly rich literature looking at the effect of conflicts on
economic outcomes. For a review see Blattman and Miguel (2010). On the effects of conflict on trade,
see the seminal work by Blomberg and Hess (2006); Glick and Taylor (2010); Egger and Gassebner
(2015).
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level (Bazzi and Blattman 2013), the micro-level studies support the existence of a
causal relationship (Berman and Couttenier 2015). Dube and Vargas (2013) show that
the effect of export price variations on conflict intensity in Colombia depends on the
type of product. A reduction in the export price of coffee (a labor intensive good)
lowers wages and increases violence (opportunity cost effect), while the increase in
the price of oil (a capital intensive good) increases its value and thus the violence to
capture it (rapacity effect). Other studies have found different effects. Crost and Felter
(2019) find that the increase in the price of the export crop in the Philippines leads to an
increase in conflict, yet this happens only in areas with low control by the insurgents.
Other cross-country studies have looked at the effect changes in the trade relations - as
proxied by trade agreements - on conflict. Vicard (2012) provides empirical evidence
that customs unions and common markets do reduce the probability of war between
members while free trade agreements have no effect on war probabilities. Martin et al.
(2008a) show that the effect of international trade on conflict is theoretically ambiguous.
On one hand, international trade increases the opportunity costs of civil conflict because
of the trade gains involved (for both the government and the rebels).
On the other hand, international trade may act as a substitute for internal trade during
civil conflicts, reducing the opportunity cost of conflict. Trade may act as a deterrent
if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars, but it may also act as an insurance if
international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil wars. They con-
clude that trade openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the
largest amount of trade) but may increase the risk of lower-scale conflicts. Martin et
al. (2008b) study the effect of different trade agreements on the probability of military
conflicts. Using data for the 1950-2000 period, they find that the probability of conflict
escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally (because of the opportunity
cost associated with the loss of trade gains) while countries more open to global trade
have a higher probability of war (because multilateral trade openness decreases bilat-
eral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict). Martin et al.
(2012) argue that regional trade agreements (RTA) can promote peaceful relations by
increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts. Using data from 1950 to 2000, they find
that in line with the theory - country pairs with large trade gains from RTAs and more
conflict in the past are more likely be part of a RTA.
Our focus is on the effect of trade liberalization on internal conflict and political vio-
lence, rather than interstate warfare. We thus regard it as complementary to the existing
literature on the pacifying effects of trade agreements. Indeed, a large literature has in-
vestigated how international trade affects conflict between states as a result of increas-
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ing economic interdependence between countries. The Liberal Peace view in political
science argues that increasing trade flows (together with free markets and democracy)
should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations.4
Several studies find a negative correlation between trade openness and the risk of war
(Oneal et al 1996; Gartzke 1998; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; Bussmann and Schnei-
der 2007; Gartzke 2007). However, overall the empirical evidence is mixed. Barbi-
eri (1996) finds that economic interdependence increases the probability of militarized
disputes, whereas Beck et al. (1998) find no significant effect of trade on conflict.
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) find that the negative relationship between trade and
conflict holds mostly among countries that are member of trade agreements. Mansfield
and Pollins (2003) bring together a number of studies showing that this relationship is
contingent on both domestic and international factors. Dorussen (2006) shows that the
relationship between trade and conflict should vary across industry sectors.
While trade generally reduces the likelihood of conflict, the relationship is weaker for
commodities that are more easily appropriable by force, and stronger for manufactured
goods (with the notable exceptions of chemical and metal industries and the high-
technology sector). This result is in line with the idea that the characteristics of the
economic activity is a crucial determinant of its effect on conflict. McDonald (2004)
notes that the effect of opening to free trade may also depend on its distributional effects:
by shaping the internal domestic policy decision process and changing the incentives of
different group of interest, free trade may increase interstate war.
Finally, there is a limited but growing literature looking at the effects of trade liberaliza-
tion on non economic outcomes such as crime (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018) and mental
distress (Crino et al., 2019). We contribute by providing robust evidence of an addi-
tional possible side-effect of the increase in trade exposure for developing countries,
namely an increase in political violence.
Conceptual Framework
Two conflicting effects link trade liberalization to political violence. First, trade tariffs
introduce a wedge between the price paid by consumers in importing countries and the
unit price paid to producers in exporting countries. Removing tariffs on imports from
4See Schneider et al. 2003, Bussmann et al. 2006, and Schneider 2014 for a discussion of the main
issues and a review of the literature.
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country A to country B increases the equilibrium level of exports from A to B. In par-
ticular, removing tariffs on agricultural goods increases agricultural output and the unit
price paid to producers in agriculture. The demand for farm labor increases, together
with agricultural wages.5 This increase in agricultural employment opportunities and
wages increases the opportunity cost of engaging in political violence and decrease its
supply (Becker 1968, Grossman 1991, Dube and Vargas 2013). If the opportunity cost
effect holds, we expect reductions in agricultural tariffs to be associated with (i) higher
levels of economic output and (ii) lower levels of political violence.
Second, a competing mechanism to the opportunity cost effect is the rapacity effect
(Becker 1968, Grossman 1999, Dube and Vargas 2013). Lets assume that armed groups
fight with the goal of appropriating resources. By raising prices, trade liberalization
may also increase gains from appropriation and, in turn, it may raise the supply of labor
in the conflict sector. If the rapacity effect holds, we expect reductions in agricultural
tariffs to be associated with (i) higher levels of economic output and (ii) higher levels of
political violence. Ultimately, whether the rapacity effect is larger than the opportunity
cost effect depends on the relationship between return to appropriation and wages as
well as on the nature of the conflict. If the return to appropriation raises relatively more
than wages, trade liberalization should increase political violence.
Regardless of which effect is at play (i.e. opportunity cost or rapacity), reductions in
agricultural tariffs does not affect all areas within the country in the same way. Agricul-
tural output and employment increase differentially more in those areas that are more
suitable to produce liberalized crops. At the same time, the positive impact on agricul-
tural employment depends on the production technology used to produce each crop and
its labor intensity.
Three elements needs to be taken into account when using PTAs to assess the effect of
trade liberalization on political violence. First, in our conceptualization of the impact
of agricultural tariff reduction, it is important to mention that, if agricultural producers
sell both on the external and the internal market, internal prices also be affected by
tariff reductions. In particular, prices of agricultural goods on the internal market can
increase, possibly offsetting the real agricultural wage gains from tariff reduction. This
issue is a problem if and only if consumers of agricultural products are concentrated
5We assume that agricultural goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with
constant returns to scale, that agricultural farms are price takers, and that wages are equal to their marginal
revenue product. Wages would still increase if we assume increasing returns to scale. In the presence of
decreasing returns to scale, however, the output to labor ratio decreases with the scale of operations, but
the marginal revenue product of labor and thus wages still increase if the positive change in prices more
than offsets the negative change in output to labor ratio
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more heavily in cells with high crop suitability compare to cell with low crop suitability,
which appears unlikely.
Second, PTAs are bilateral or plurilateral agreements. They do not only reduce tariffs
on South countries’ imports to the North countries, but it also decrease tariffs on North
countries’ imports to South countries. As a result, and despite the asymmetry in the
timing of tariff cuts, the impact of agricultural tariff reduction for South countries is
potentially mitigated by a reduction on import tariffs from North country on the same
crops. The larger the latter effect, the less likely is that PTA has a positive impact on
economic activity in South countries.
Third, PTAs did reduce tariffs for both agricultural and manufacturing products. Thus
the same arguments apply for the latter: manufacturing tariff reductions increase output,
labor demand and wages in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, PTAs may have in-
creased the opportunity cost of engaging in political violence not through an increase in
employment opportunities and wages in agriculture, but rather in manufacturing. How-
ever, our empirical strategy allows us to only focus on the impact of agricultural tariff
reductions. Yet, it should be noted that manufacturing tariff reductions would confound
our estimates if and only if those cells that are more suitable to produce liberalized crops
are also those that benefit more from manufacturing trade liberalization. That is, those
manufacturing sectors for which tariffs decreased more should be overrepresented in
those cells that are particularly suitable to produce liberalized crops. This is far from
being the case, as most of manufacturing activity is concentrated in metropolitan areas.
Data
In our empirical analysis, we plan to combine data from different sources. Our geo-
graphical unit of analysis is a 9km×9km cell. There are 255,813 cells in our dataset for
a given year (perfectly balanced panel). We first describe our sample and present our
main independent variables.
Sample. Our sample covers 27 South countries between 1995 and 2014. We define
a country as South country if it is not a high-income economy according to the World
Bank categorization.6 Our sample includes all the PTAs formed by these 27 countries
with all major North trading entities: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan,
6For details see here: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/
906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
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South Korea, and the United States. Table A1 in the appendix provides the list of
countries included in the sample and the PTAs that these countries sign with North
countries.
Our sample of countries has several appealing features. First, with few exception, the
South countries in our sample show on average relatively low levels of violence. Many
of them are quite stable democratic regimes. Notably, our sample excludes almost en-
tirely Sub-Saharan Africa (except for South Africa), which experienced more than half
of worldwide conflict incidents, despite having only about 16 percent of the world pop-
ulation (Cilliers 2015). In short, our sample sets a lower bound to find any relationship
between trade and conflict. Second, North-South PTAs are more likely to be enforced
due to power asymmetry (Baccini and Urpelainen 2014) and less likely to produce trade
diversion compare to South-South PTAs (Magee 2008). Third, a scope condition of our
theory is that South countries have a comparative advantage in agricultural products
with respect to North countries. This scope condition is likely not to hold in many
South-South trade relations.
Tariff Reductions. The second piece of information pertains to the details of PTAs
and its implementation. We use the information in the Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database (Dür, Baccini and Elsig 2014). These data provide information on
various types of preferential trade agreements for the time period between 1947 and
2014. For each agreement, the data include sector coverage, depth of commitments,
trade integration and compliance tools.
Importantly for this project, DESTA provides information on baseline tariffs and reduc-
tions through the implementation period for each product at the 6-digit Foreign Trade
Harmonized (HS) code.7 At this level, we find tariffs for specific goods, such as “cacao”
or “coffee”, and we observe large differences in tariff reduction across products, which
is crucial for our empirical strategy. There are two tariff schedules, one for North coun-
tries vis-á-vis South countries, and one for South countries vis-á-vis North countries.
Tariff data are highly disaggregated, namely at the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System (HS) 6-digit level.
Tariff schedules are extracted from the officially negotiated tariff schedules listed in
the appendices of the PTAs. Thus, our tariff cuts are de jure and not de facto, i.e.
countries can set applied tariffs that are different from the ones negotiated. As such,
de jure tariffs should be more exogenous than de facto tariffs. To assess the effect of
7For further information on tariff data, see Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2018.
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PTAs on South countries’ cells, we rely on the year of the signature of the agreement.
Indeed, at the time of the signature relevant actors know that preferential tariff cuts kick
in and so they are likely to change their behaviour before the actual implementation of
the agreements. In other words, relying on the year of ratification is likely to generate
anticipatory effects.
Crop Suitability and Potential Yields. We combine the information on tariff reduc-
tions with heterogeneity in crop suitability and potential yields across South African
local municipalities. For this purpose, we use information from the Global Aero-
ecological Zones (GAEZ Version 3) project (IIASA/FAO 2012, Fischer, van Nelthuizen,
Shah and Nachtergaele 2002). Pursued jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Institute for Applied System
Analysis (IIASA), the paper produces detailed agronomic-based knowledge to assess
land suitability and potential attainable yields. The corresponding data are freely avail-
able online, and have already been used in economic studies (Adamopoulos and Restuc-
cia 2018, Bustos, Caprettini and Ponticelli 2016).
For each 9km×9km cell in which the planet is divided into, and for each of the main
crops, the data carry information on suitability and potential yield. In particular, we
use the information on total production capacity per hectare under rain-fed agriculture
and using low or intermediate level of inputs. These estimates of production capacity
are solely based on agro-climatic conditions in the years 1961-1990, and are therefore
exogenous to any change in the technology of agricultural production that might have
occurred with the implementation of TDCA. As a result, GAEZ data allows us to derive
an exogenous, agro-climatic-based measure of total production capacity for different
crops for each South African local municipality. Figure 1 show tariff change by crop
for the entire sample of trade agreements used in the analysis.
Let’s now describe our left hand-side variables. Our chain of causation goes as fol-
lows: trade liberalization affects economic outcome through crop suitability, and in
turn, lower tariffs reduce (opportunity cost effect) or increase (rapacity effect) the sup-
ply of violence. Therefore, we use two main outcome variables.
Economic Outcome. We use luminosity as a proxy of GDP (Henderson et al 2012,
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). Data come from from the Defense Meteo-
rological Satellite Programs Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) that reports
time-stable images of the earth at night captured between 8pm and 9:30pm. The main
9
Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements


















































































































































































Notes. (Initial - Final) tariff by crop (average across HS4 digit related crops across all the agreements). Source: Desta (Baccini
et al 2017).
advantage of luminosity data is that they can be aggregated at the cell level, i.e. they
have the same level of aggregation as our independent variables.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of luminosity by country. It is evident that the
variable luminosity has few outliers with large values. Thus, following previous studies
(Henderson et al 2012, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, Pinkovskiy, and Sala-
i-Martin 2016), we use the log of the raw value of luminosity, adding one not to lose
observations with zero luminosity. We do so to avoid that few observations drive the
results.
Political Violence. In order to derive a comprehensive measure of political instabil-
ity at the cell level, we rely on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS)
dataset (Shilliday and Lautenschlager 2012). Prepared by the Lockheed Martin Ad-
vanced Technology Laboratories, these data have been recently made available online.
The dataset covers the period from 1995 and 2015. It records any interaction between
socio-political actors (i.e., cooperative or hostile actions between individuals, groups,
10
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Luminosity by country
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Algeria 0.63 3.73 0 63
Cambodia 0.15 1.81 0 63
Colombia 0.99 4.60 0 63
Costa Rica 3.39 7.18 0 63
Dominican Republic 3.42 8.36 0 63
Egypt 2.13 8.64 0 63
El Salvador 4.63 7.86 0 63
Guatemala 1.84 5.63 0 63
Honduras 1.27 4.71 0 63
India 3.54 6.56 0 63
Indonesia 0.92 4.12 0 63
Jordan 2.63 8.41 0 63
Laos 0.12 1.68 0 63
Lebanon 17.42 16.24 0 63
Malaysia 2.86 8.68 0 63
Mexico 2.23 7.09 0 63
Morocco 1.23 5.11 0 63
Myanmar 0.21 1.95 0 63
Nicaragua 0.50 3.24 0 63
Panama 1.18 5.17 0 63
Peru 0.38 2.93 0 63
Philippines 1.21 4.92 0 63
South Africa 1.42 6.06 0 63
Thailand 3.15 8.08 0 63
Tunisia 2.86 7.66 0 63
Turkey 2.63 6.71 0 63
Vietnam 2.04 6.02 0 63
Total 1.79 5.92 0 63
sectors and nation states). Therefore, differently from other dataset such as Armed Con-
flict Location and Event Dataset, the ICEWS dataset does not only focus on episodes of
political violence, but also codes and classifies any interaction that is political in nature.
For instance, ICEWS events also include political statements, accusations of crime or
corruption or human right abuses. Each entry provides information on the source and
target of each interaction, together with the level of hostility involved using a scale
from -10 to 10. Events are automatically identified and extracted from news articles,
and geo-referenced and time-stamped accordingly.
We build our panel dataset of political violence at the cell level as follows. We keep all
events geo-referenced between 1995 and 2014 in the 27 South countries and classified
as hostile, meaning having intensity value from -10 to -1 (inclusive). We then classify
11
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Political Violence by country
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Algeria 0.01 1.09 0 312
Cambodia 0.09 3.33 0 274
Colombia 0.07 5.05 0 1031
Costa Rica 0.09 1.71 0 88
Dominican Republic 0.05 0.95 0 42
Egypt 0.09 11.73 0 3835
El Salvador 0.17 2.76 0 104
Guatemala 0.08 2.26 0 149
Honduras 0.06 2.20 0 303
India 0.20 8.20 0 2179
Indonesia 0.05 4.16 0 1181
Jordan 0.11 3.48 0 215
Laos 0.00 0.29 0 44
Lebanon 5.55 58.97 0 2479
Malaysia 0.09 3.64 0 417
Mexico 0.05 2.75 0 775
Morocco 0.02 0.79 0 121
Myanmar 0.02 1.15 0 200
Nicaragua 0.03 1.09 0 106
Panama 0.03 0.85 0 58
Peru 0.02 1.67 0 643
Philippines 0.35 8.87 0 857
South Africa 0.07 2.26 0 417
Thailand 0.19 13.41 0 3182
Tunisia 0.07 4.82 0 689
Turkey 0.10 4.73 0 836
Vietnam 0.03 1.42 0 145
Total 0.09 6.05 0 3835
each category as violent or non-violent.8 We capture all events of political violence in
which civilians, the government, and related entities (such as the police) are identified as
the source. We also keep all the events regardless of the target. Our final dataset counts
472,980 events of political violence between 1999 and 2014 in the 27 South countries.
The most frequent event types are: use of unconventional violence, fighting with small
arms and light weapons, and use of conventional military force. We geographically
match each event to the closest location , and sum them at the cell and year level. This
allows us to track the evolution of political violence in each cell over time.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the count variable Politcal Violence by country.
8See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the details of our classification.
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Two features stand out. First, and not surprisingly, there is a large heterogeneity across
countries. Second, the number of violent episodes is quite low, since we work at the
cell level. Thus, in our main analysis we use the log of the count of violent episodes
in cell i in time t (adding one not to lose observations with no violence) to mitigate the
impact of outliers. In the robustness checks, we show that our results are not sensitive
to this choice.
Empirical Strategy
We expect the implementation of PTAs to affect political violence through its positive
impact on agricultural production, employment, and wages. We expect these effects
to be larger in those cells that are more suitable to produce the more liberalized crops.
For example, if PTAs decreased tariffs on maize more than for coffee, we would expect
a larger increase in agricultural employment and wages in those cells that are highly
suitable to produce maize, and less of an effect in those that are suitable for coffee.
That is, the extent to which we expect each cell to be affected by PTAs is determined
by the interaction between the size of tariff reductions and crop suitability.
We derive such measure of exposure to PTAs as follows. Let τct be the proportional
change in tariffs applied to South countries’ imports to North countries of crop c be-
tween the baseline and year t. That is, if baseline tariffs applied to maize were 10




Let then Sic be the suitability of cell i to produce crop c, as measured by the agro-
climatic-based total production capacity from GAEZ data. Our measure Eit of export





This is our variable of interest. Notice that, by definition, in the construction of our
export exposure variable, we only consider those crops that are both affected by PTAs
(τct > 0) and that at least one cell is suitable to produce (Sic > 0).9 Moreover, τct
is time-specific and common to all cells, while Sic is not. Variation in Sic across cells
is given by heterogeneity in their suitability in producing different crops. This is de-
9The interested crops are: Banana/Plantain, Cabbage, Cacao, Carrot, Chickpea, Citrus, Coffee, Cot-
ton, Dry pea, Flax, Groundnut, Maize, Oil palm, Olive, Onion, Phaseolus bean, Rape, Sorghum, Soybean,
Sunflower, Sweet potato, Tea, Tobacco, Wetlandrice, Wheat, White potato.
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rived using GAEZ estimates of production capacity that are informed by agro-climatic
conditions only. Therefore, our source of cross-cell heterogeneity in export exposure is
determined a priori and does not respond itself to the implementation of PTAs. Figure
2 shows the variation of export exposure by country.10
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Regression Specification. Our goal is to find evidence of a systematic relationship
between export exposure Eit and our outcome of interest Yit. This variable measures
both economic output by looking at luminosity and political violence by counting the
number of ICEWS events that took place in local municipality i in year t. We use all
observations of cells from the year 1999 to 2014 and implement the following baseline
regression specification
Yit = γi + δt + βEit + uit (2)
In this specification, cell fixed effects γi control for time-invariant characteristics at
the cell level, while δt nets out year-specific trends that are common to all cells. uit
10We are unable to obtain estimates for Tunisia and Turkey since they both sign only one PTA (with
the EU) throughout our time span, i.e. e does not vary over time.
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captures instead any residual determinant of political violence in a cell i in year t. If the
opportunity cost effect is at play, β < 0. If the rapacity effect is at play, β > 0.
We enrich our baseline specification with country- and grid-specific linear time trends
(including flexible trends). We also include country-year fixed effects, which account
for time-varying country specific characteristics, e.g. type of regime or level of devel-
opment. Moreover, we include spatial lags to control for spillover effects of economic
output and violence.
Results
In line with our conceptual framework, we first present the results related to the effect
of export exposure on economic output and then explore the effect of export exposure
on political violence.
Economic Output
Results of the effect of export exposure on the economic output is reported in Table 3.
The sign of e is positive and statistically significant in every model except in Models
7 and 8. More specifically, Model 1 reports the results of our baseline estimates with
cell and year fixed effects. Model 2 includes country-specific trends as a first check
of the parallel trend assumption. Model 3 includes grid-specific trends, where a grid
is a 550km×550km area. This second set of trends allows a more accurate test of the
parallel trend assumption. Model 4 includes spatial lags to account for spillover effects,
which would violate the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). In short,
spatial lags are 110km×110km grids that capture the sum of export exposure in the
other FAO cells falling within the same bigger grid.11 Model 5 is a model that include
country-year fixed effects. For computational reasons, we are unable to run this model
on the entire sample and so we run it on a random sub-sample that includes ten percent
of the total observations.
To further defend the parallel trend assumption, we include country-specific flexible
trends. That is, every country has its own trend in the years prior to signature, a jump
in year of signature, and another linear trend in the years after. This should account for
any confounding factors varying together export exposure at the country level. Model 6
11Each of these smaller grids include 24 FAO cells.
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shows that our results hold even in this case. Moreover, we include flexible trends which
are different within country between treated (export exposure>0 at any point) and non-
treated cells. These trends are similar to the previous ones, but they vary between the
two groups, i.e. treated and controls. Model 7 shows that the results hold even with this
model specification.12
Furthermore, Model 8 includes a rich set of geographic and location controls. To ac-
count for elevation, we construct the average altitude in the cell by averaging out the
1km×1km raster dataset from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). To further account on differences on geographic characteristics, we use a
measure of ruggedness of terrain derived by Nunn and Puga (2010).13 To capture cli-
matic features, we construct the cell level average precipitation in millilitres from 1960
to 1991 from the Climatic Research Unit 2.0.14 We retrieve cell-level data on averages
temperature from 1960 and 1991 from FAO GAEZ. We then calculate the total area, the
area covered by water (using water bodies in the Digital Chart of the World) and the
absolute latitude for each cell. We compute distances from cell centroids to the country
border and to the coast.15 Finally, we calculate the number of ethnic groups in the cell
from the Geo-referencing of ethnic groups (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Ketil Rd, and
Cederman 2010).16
Note that all these cell-specific characteristics are time invariant and so they cannot be
included alone since they are perfectly correlated with cell fixed effects. By interact-
ing them with linear trends, we account for cell-specific characteristics that may vary
together with export exposure with the risk of violating the parallel trend assumption.
There is no evidence of that: our results remain the same as in the previous model
specifications.17
12We run these two models on a random subsample that includes ten percent of the total observations.
13The original dataset is constructed at the 1km×1km resolution (30 arc-second grid). As for the
elevation data, we calculate the average ruggedness in the cell. Further information about the Terrain
Ruggedness Index can be found at http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
14Original data can be accessed at https://crudata.uea.ac.uk/∼timm/grid/CRU TS 2 0.html.
15We perform distance calculation using the WGS84 Equal Area Scalable Earth (EASE) projection.
16This is the digital version of the paper Soviet Narodov Mira atlas created in 1964. In 2010 the GREG
project digitized all maps depicting the spatial distribution of ethnic groups contained in this Atlas. Data
is available at https://icr.ethz.ch/data/greg/.
17We run this model on a random subsample that includes ten percent of the total observations.
16
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The magnitude of the effect is not trivial. Indeed, with our estimates in hand, we can
calculate the percentage gain in aggregate economic output attributable to the policy.
Setting the value of the coefficient of interest equal to zero, we predict the value of
output in each cell that we would have observed in absence of the PTA. We find that,
in South countries, the economic output value would have been 2.2 percent lower in
absence of the trade agreement with major North trading entities.18
Finally, we re-run some of our main models including a proxy for import exposure.19
Indeed, PTAs are symmetric agreements in which both parties are required to cut tariffs.
Import exposure is built in a similar way as export exposure. The only difference is that
we use tariff reductions implemented by South countries with North countries in inter-
action with crop suitability.20 Results are shown in Table 4. Export exposure remains
positive and significant in every model, except Model 1, whereas import exposure is
never significant.21
Robustness Checks. We implement several robustness checks to corroborate our re-
sults. First, we re-run all models in Table 3 using the raw data of luminosity to check
if our results are sensitive to the log transformation. Results are virtually the same as
showed in Table A.3 in the appendix. Second, our results hold if we drop these cells
with zero luminosity (see Table A.4 in the appendix).22 Third, our results hold if we use
wild-bootstrapped clustered standard errors at the level of the country or if we cluster
standard errors at the level of the grid. Both tests produce more conservative standard
errors.23 Finally, Table A.5 reports the results of our baseline model for each country.
Out of 25 countries, the coefficient of export exposure is positive and significant for
18 countries, whereas for only one country (Peru) the coefficient of e is negative and
significant.24
18We quantify the percentage increase in aggregate economic output value as follows. We use the
coefficient estimates in column (1) of Table 3 to predict the value of output ŷit in each cell and year. We
also predict the value of output ỹit that we would have observed if β = 0, i.e. ỹit = ŷit− β̂Eit×Eit. We









s ỹit. The estimated increase in aggregate economic output value due to the policy is
given by (Ỹ − Ŷ )/Ŷ .
19We run these model on a random subsample that includes ten percent of the total observations.
20Figure A.1 shows the scatter plot of the average reduction of export tariff versus the average reduction
of import tariff.
21We run these models on a random sub-sample that includes ten percent of the total observations.
22Results hold if we first-difference luminosity to capture economic growth rather than level of eco-
nomic output.
23The last two sets of checks are available upon request.
24We acknowledge that this test is biased in favor of big countries, which have a larger number of
observations and so smaller standard errors.
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In sum, North-South PTAs have a large positive long-lasting effect on the economic
output of cells with high crop suitability in developing countries. This implies that both
wages and gains from appropriation increase differentially more in cells with high crop
suitability compare to cells with low crop suitability. The net effect of export exposure
on violence depends on which of these two increases dominates the other, something
that we explore in the next sub-section.
Political Violence
We now move to explore the second outcome: political violence. Figure 3 shows pre-
liminary evidence of the impact of trade liberalization on political violence. We define
a dummy equal to one if the cell is suitable to produce any of the liberalized crops. We
also define a set of time dummies, one for each year before and after the PTA signature.
We then regress the level of violence in the cell over the set of year dummies, cell fixed
effects, and the interaction between the year dummies and the suitability dummy. The
estimated coefficients of these interactions capture the difference in the level of violence
between suitable and non-suitable cells in each year.





t-9 t-8 t-7 t-6 t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9
Years from PTA Signature
99% CI coefficient of PTA exposure (e)
Notes. Dependent variable is the log of the count of violent episodes. The Figure plots the estimated coefficient of the inter-
action of export exposure variable e with the corresponding year dummy. The solid vertical lines show the 99% confidence
interval of each estimate, while the dash horizontal line indicates zero. Sources: Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and ICEWS.
Figure 3 plots these estimated coefficients together with their 99% confidence interval.
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We do not find any evidence of a systematic difference in the level of violence between
suitable and non-suitable cells in the years prior to the PTA signature. This indicates
that, once cell time-invariant characteristics and time trends are controlled for in a flexi-
ble way, suitable and non-suitable cells are no different in their level of violence prior to
the PTA signature. A significant difference emerges instead in the years following the
PTA signature. Violence increases differentially in those cells that are suitable to pro-
duce liberalized crops, as we record a systematically higher level of violence in these
cells with respect to non-suitable ones.
Table 5 shows the main results in a more systematic way. The export exposure variable
E has always a positive sign, except in Model 7, and it is significant across all model
specifications. The coefficient remains positive and significant even when we include
country-specific and grid-specific trends (Models 2 and 3), which check the validity
of the parallel trend assumption. Moreover, the results hold when we include spatial
lags to account for spillover effects of violence (Model 4) as well as when we include
country-year fixed effects, effects, which control for any time-varying heterogeneity
across countries (Model 5).25
In line with luminosity, we also include country-specific flexible trends and flexible
trends which are different within country between treated and non-treated cells (respec-
tively Model 6 and 7). Results remain positive and significant. Moreover, we obtain
similar results if we include time-invariant cell-specific characteristics in interaction
with linear trends (Model 8). All in all, the fact that our results are robust to saturate
the models with different types of trends reassure us against the risk of violating the
parallel trend assumptions and validate our identification strategy.
Finally, Table 6 includes import exposure in some of our main models. Our results
hold in every model, except Model 7. Interestingly, import exposure is negative and
significant in all the model but Model 7. This finding is in line with the rapacity effect.
Since import exposure reduces the rents available in these cells that face the competition
of North countries, gains from appropriation are smaller, reducing incentives to engage
in political violence.
25We run this and subsequent models on a random subsample that includes ten percent of the total
observations.
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Even with respect to this outcome, the magnitude of the effect is not trivial. Again,
we can use our estimates to calculate the total fraction of events of political violence
that can be attributed to the PTAs. Setting the value of the interaction term equal to
zero, we can predict the number of events per cell in each year that we would have
observed if the trend in political violence had never diverged across cells after the PTA
signature. According to the estimates in Model 1 of Table 5, the effects of PTAs that we
investigate account for an increase of 10 percent of the total number of violent events
in South countries in the period under investigation.26
Robustness Checks. We implement several robustness checks to corroborate our re-
sults. First, we show that results are similar if we use a dummy for political violence
(Table A.6). Second, results are substantively unchanged if we use the raw value of
political violence, i.e. count outcome without log transformation (Table A.7).27 Third,
our results hold if we use wild-bootstrapped clustered standard errors at the level of
the country or if we cluster standard errors at the level of the grid. Both tests produce
more conservative standard errors.28 Finally, Table A.8 reports the results of our base-
line model for each country. Out of 25 countries, the coefficient of export exposure is
positive and significant for 14 countries, whereas for only two countries (Algeria and
Peru) the coefficient of e is negative and significant.
All in all, our results support the rapacity effect hypothesis. PTAs exposure increases
the economic output and in turn, raises gains from appropriation. As a result of that,
a larger number of people are dragged into the conflict and/or existing fighting groups
engage more frequently with conflict than it happened before the formation of PTAs.
This leads to an increase of the occurrence of violent episodes differentially more in
cells with high crop suitability than in cells with low crop suitability.
Beyond North-South Cooperation. To check how generalizable our results are, we
re-run our main models with all trade agreements formed by China with South coun-
26We quantify the percentage reduction in political violence as follows. We use the coefficient esti-
mates in Model 1 of Table 5 to predict the value of political violence ŷit in each cell and year. We also
predict the value of political violence ỹit that we would have observed if β = 0, i.e. ỹit = ŷit−β̂eit×eit.









s ỹit. The estimated increase in political violence due to the policy is given by Ỹ − Ŷ )/Ŷ .
27If we drop the cells that never experience violent episodes throughout the time span, results are
similar, though weaker. Results are also similar if we use negative binomial regressions and zero-inflated
negative binomial regressions, which are particularly suitable with count outcomes, though they struggle
often to converge. This set of results is available upon request.
28The last two sets of checks are available upon request.
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tries. In doing so, we are able to explore what is the effect of South-South PTAs on
economic output and violence and to see if results differ from North-South PTAs. China
formed PTAs with ASEAN countries (2004), Pakistan (2006), and Peru (2009).29 Pak-
istan is the only country that was not included in our previous analysis.
Tables A.9 and A.10 report the results for the Chinese PTAs. Findings are in line with
the North-South PTAs. Export exposure increases economic output and political vio-
lence. In addition to improve the external validity of our analysis, these results help
also elucidate why we find evidence of anticipatory effect. Take ASEAN-China , for
instance: this free trade area, which was signed in 2004, is likely to create anticipatory
effects in ASEAN countries for the PTAs formed by Australia and Japan with the same
countries in subsequent years.
Conclusion
Our paper explores the micro-foundations of the trade-conflict nexus. Our results are
two-fold. First, North-South PTAs increase substantively the economic output of areas
with high crop suitability compare to areas with low crop suitability. To our knowledge,
we are the first study to estimate the effect of PTAs on agricultural output with micro-
level data. Second, we find strong support for the rapacity effect. After the forma-
tion of North-South PTAs political violence increases differentially more in areas with
high crop suitability than in areas with low crop suitability. This finding implies that
gains from appropriation increases proportionally more than wages and that positive
economic shocks triggered by trade liberalization fuel intra-state conflict in developing
countries.
References
Adamopoulos, T., and D. Restuccia (2018). “Geography and Agricultural Productivity:
Cross-Country Evidence from Micro Plot-Level Data,” NBER Working Papers 24532,
National Bureau of Economic Research
Amodio, Francesco Leonardo Baccini, Michele Di Maio, Security, Trade, and Politi-
cal Violence. Journal of the European Economic Association, published online on 10
January 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz060.
29China formed PTAs with New Zealand and Singapore, which are however high-income countries.
25
Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements
Autor, David H., Dorn, David, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. (2016). “Importing
Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure.” NBER
Working Papers 22637. National Bureau of Economic Research
Baccini L., Dür, A., and M. Elsig (2018). “Intra-Industry Trade, Global Value Chains,
and Preferential Tariff Liberalization,” International Studies Quarterly. Volume 62, Is-
sue 2, Pages 329340
Baccini, L. and J. Urpelainen (2014). “Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform:
When and How International Institutions Help,” Oxford University Press, chapter 7
Barbieri, Katherine (1996). “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of
Interstate Conflict?”, Journal of Peace Research 33(1): 2949
Barbieri, K., and Reuveny, R. (2005). “Economic Globalization and Civil War,” Jour-
nal of Politics, 67(4), 12281247
Bazzi, S., and C. Blattman (2014). “Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from
Commodity Prices,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(4), 138
Beck, Nathaniel; Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker, (1998). “Taking Time Seriously
in Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science
42(1): 12601288
Becker, G. S. (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of
Political Economy, 76, 169-217
Berman, N., M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig (2014). “This Mine is Mine!
How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa,” American Economic Review, Volume 107, Is-
sue 6, pp. 1564-1610
Berman, N., and M. Couttenier. (2015). “External Shocks, Internal Shots: The Ge-
ography of Civil Conflicts,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 97, Issue 4,
p.758-776
Besley, T., and M. Reynal-Querol (2014). “The Legacy of Historical Conflicts. Evi-
dence from Africa,” American Political Science Review, 108(2), 319-336
Blattman, C., and J. Annan (2016). “Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebel-
lion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State,” American Political
Science Review. Volume 110, Issue 1, pp. 1-17
26
Francesco Amodio, Leonardo Baccini, Giorgio Chiovelli, and Michele Di Maio
Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010). “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48(1),
3-57
Bohlken, A. T. and Sergenti, E. J. (2010). “Economic Growth and Ethnic Violence: An
Empirical Investigation of Hindu-Muslim Riots in India,” Journal of Peace Research,
47(5): 589-600
Brock Blomberg S. and Hess, G.D., (2006). “How Much Does Violence Tax Trade?”
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4): 599-612
Brückner, M., and A. Ciccone (2010). “International Commodity Prices, Growth and
the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Political Economy, 120,
519-534
Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, K., Holtermann, H., Ostby, G. and Tollefsen, A. (2011).“ Its the
local economy, stupid! Geographic wealth dispersion and conict outbreak location,”
Journal of Conict Resolution, 55(5): 814-840
Bussmann, M., and Schneider, G. (2007). “When Globalization Discontent Turns Vio-
lent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War,” International Studies Quar-
terly, 51(1), 7997
Bussmann, M., Scheuthle, H. and Gerald Schneider, G. (2006). “Trade Liberalization
and Political Instability in Developing Countries,” in R. Trappl, R. (ed.), Programming
for Peace, Chapter 3, 4970. Springer
Bustos, P., Caprettini, B. and J. Ponticelli (2016). “Agricultural Productivity and Struc-
tural Transformation: Evidence from Brazil,” American Economic Review, 106(6),
1320-1365
Cali, M. Mulabdic, A. (2017). Trade and civil conflict: Revisiting the cross-country
evidence. Review of International Economics, vol. 25 (1), Pages 195232
Cilliers, J. (2015).“Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in
Africa,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 287
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler (1998). “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Eco-
nomics Papers, 50, 563-573
27
Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Eco-
nomics Papers, 56, 563-595
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2009). “Beyond greed and grievance: feasibil-
ity and civil war,” Oxford Economic. Papers, 61(1): 1-27
Cooper, T. P. (1916). “Labor Requirements of Crop Production,” St Paul, Minnesota,
University Farm
Costinot, A. and Dave Donaldson, D. (2016). How Large Are the Gains from Economic
Integration? Theory and Evidence from U.S. Agriculture, 1880-1997. NBER Working
Paper No. 22946
Crino, R., Colantone, I. and Ogliari, L. (2019). Globalization and Mental Distress.
Journal of International Economics, Volume 119, Pages 181-207
Crost, B. and Felter, J.H. (2019). Export crops and civil conflict. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, forthcoming
Dix-Carneiro, R., Soares, R.R., and Ulyssea, G. (2018). Economic Shocks and Crime:
Evidence from the Brazilian Trade Liberalization. American Economic Journal: Ap-
plied Economics, vol.10(4): 158195
Dorussen, Han (2006). Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict: What You Trade
Matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 50 (1) p. 87-107
Dube, O., and J. F. Vargas (2013):. “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evi-
dence from Colombia,” The Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1384-1421
Dür, A., Baccini L., and M. Elsig (2014). “The Design of International Trade Agree-
ments: Introducing a New Dataset,” The Review of International Organizations, 9(3),
353-375
Egger, P. and Gassebne, M. (2015). International terrorism as a trade impediment? Ox-
ford Economic Papers, 4262
Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 97, 7590
Fearon, J. (2005). “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.” Journal of Conict
Resolution, 49, 483507
28
Francesco Amodio, Leonardo Baccini, Giorgio Chiovelli, and Michele Di Maio
Fischer, G., van Nelthuizen, H., Shah, M. and F. Nachtergaele (2002).“Global Agro-
Ecological Assessment for Agriculture in the 21st Century: Methodology and Results,”
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome
Gartzke, Erik (1998). “Kant we all just get along? Opportunity, willingness, and the
origins of the democratic peace,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 42(1):
1-27
Gartzke, Erik. (2007). “The capitalist peace,” American Journal of Political Science
51(1): 166-191
Glick, R. and Taylor, A.M. (2010). “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Eco-
nomic Impact of War,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(1): 102-127
Grossman, H. (1991). “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 81, 912-921
Harari, M., and E. La Ferrara (2018). “Conflict, Climate and Cells: A Disaggregated
Analysis”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 100, Issue 4, 594-608
Henderson, V.J., Storeygard, A., and Weil, D.N. (2012). “Measuring Economic Growth
from Outer Space”. American Economic Review. vol.102, 994-1028
Hidalgo, F. D., Naidu, S., Nichter, S. and Richardson, N. (2010).“ Economic Determi-
nants of Land Invasions,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3): 505523
Justino, P. (2009). “ Poverty and violent conflict: A micro-level perspective on the
causes and duration of warfare,” Journal of Peace Research 46 (3), 315-333
Magee, Christopher SP. (2008). “New measures of trade creation and trade diversion.”
Journal of International Economics 75(2): 349-362
Mansfield, E. D., and J. C. Pevehouse. (2000). “Trade blocs, trade flows, and interna-
tional conflict,” International Organization 54(4): 775-808
Mansfield, E. D., and B. M. Pollins, (2003). “Economic Interdependence and Inter-
national Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate”, University of Michigan
Press
Martin P., Mayer T. and Thoenig M. (2008a). “Civil Wars and International Trade,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3), 541-550
29
Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements
Martin, P., Mayer, T. and Thoenig, M. (2008b). “Make Trade Not War?” Review of
Economic Studies, 75, 865900
Martin, P., Mayer, T. and Thoenig. M. (2012). “The Geography of Conflicts and Re-
gional Trade Agreements”. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(4): 1-35
McDonald, P.J. (2004). “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 48(4): 547-572
McGuirk, E. and Burke, M. (2017). “The Economic Origins of Conflict in Africa”.
HiCN Working Paper 242
Meyer, T., and M. Thoenig (2016). “Regional Trade Agreements and the pacification
of Eastern Africa,” IGC Working Paper
Michalopoulos, S., and Papaioannou, A. (2013) ”National Institutions and Sub-national
Development in Africa.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1): 151213
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict:
An Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 112, 725753
Nunn, Nathan, and Diego Puga. (2012) “Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography
in Africa.” Review of Economics and Statistics 94(1): 20-36
Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett (1996). “The Liberal
Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 195085,” Journal of
Peace Research 33 (1): 1128
Pinkovskiy, M. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2016). Lights, Camera, Income! Illuminat-
ing the National Accounts-Household Surveys Debate. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 131 (2): 579-631
Raleigh, C., A. Linke, H. Hegre, and J. Karlsen (2010). “Introducing ACLED: An
armed conflict location and event dataset: Special data feature,” Journal of Peace Re-
search 47(5), 651-660
Schneider, G., Barbieri, K. and Gleditsch, N.P. (2003). “Globalization and Armed Con-
flict.” Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Schneider, G. (2014). “Peace through globalization and capitalism? Prospects of two
liberal propositions,” Journal of Peace Research, 51(2): 173-183
30
Francesco Amodio, Leonardo Baccini, Giorgio Chiovelli, and Michele Di Maio
Shilliday, A., and J. Lautenschlager (2012). “Data for a Global ICEWS and Ongoing
Research,” 2nd International Conference on Cross-Cultural Decision Making: Focus
2012
The Economist (2013). “Civil War. The Picture in Africa,” http://www.economist.com/
blogs/baobab/2013/11/civil-wars (accessed July 8, 2016)
Vicard, V. (2012). Trade, conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogene-
ity of regional trade agreements. European Economic Review, Volume 56, Issue 1,
Pages 5471
Weidmann, Nils B., Jan Ketil Rd, and Lars-Erik Cederman. (2010). “Representing Eth-
nic Groups in Space: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 47(4): 49199
31
Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix: Tables and Figures












SweetpotatoCassavaY m nd C coyam











































-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0
Average Reduction in log of Import Tariff+1
Notes. Average reduction in log of export tariff versus average reduction in log of import tariff by crop (average across HS4 digit
related crops across all the agreements). Source: Desta (Baccini et al 2017).
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Trade Liberalization and Political Violence: Evidence from North-South Preferential Trade Agreements
TABLE A.2: CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT EVENTS 1/4
Violent CAMEO Event Category
1 Abduct, hijack, or take hostage
1 Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action
1 Assassinate
1 Attempt to assassinate
1 Carry out car bombing
1 Carry out roadside bombing
1 Carry out suicide bombing
1 Coerce
1 Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing
1 Demonstrate military or police power
1 Destroy property
1 Employ aerial weapons
1 Engage in ethnic cleansing
1 Engage in mass expulsion
1 Engage in mass killings
1 Engage in violent protest for leadership change
1 Expel or deport individuals
1 Expel or withdraw
1 Expel or withdraw peacekeepers
1 Fight with artillery and tanks
1 Fight with small arms and light weapons
1 Kill by physical assault
1 Mobilize or increase armed forces
1 Mobilize or increase police power
1 Physically assault
1 Protest violently, riot
1 Seize or damage property
1 Sexually assault
1 Torture
1 Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons
1 Use conventional military force
1 Use tactics of violent repression
1 Use unconventional violence
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TABLE A.2: CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT EVENTS 2/4
Violent CAMEO Event Category
0 Accuse
0 Accuse of aggression
0 Accuse of crime, corruption
0 Accuse of espionage, treason
0 Accuse of human rights abuses
0 Accuse of war crimes
0 Appeal for change in institutions, regime
0 Appeal for change in leadership
0 Appeal for de-escalation of military engagement
0 Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions
0 Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
0 Appeal for easing of political dissent
0 Appeal for policy change
0 Appeal for political reform
0 Appeal for release of persons or property
0 Appeal for rights
0 Appeal for target to allow international involvement (non-mediation)
0 Appeal to yield
0 Ban political parties or politicians
0 Bring lawsuit against
0 Complain officially
0 Conduct hunger strike
0 Conduct hunger strike for policy change
0 Conduct strike or boycott
0 Conduct strike or boycott for policy change
0 Confiscate property
0 Criticize or denounce
0 Decline comment
0 Defy norms, law
0 Demand
0 Demand change in institutions, regime
0 Demand change in leadership
0 Demand de-escalation of military engagement
0 Demand diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)
0 Demand easing of administrative sanctions
0 Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
0 Demand easing of political dissent
0 Demand economic aid
0 Demand humanitarian aid
0 Demand intelligence cooperation
0 Demand judicial cooperation
4
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TABLE A.2: CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT EVENTS 3/4
Violent CAMEO Event Category
0 Demand material cooperation
0 Demand mediation
0 Demand meeting, negotiation
0 Demand military aid
0 Demand policy change
0 Demand political reform
0 Demand release of persons or property
0 Demand rights
0 Demand settling of dispute
0 Demand that target yields
0 Demonstrate for leadership change
0 Demonstrate for policy change





0 Impose administrative sanctions
0 Impose blockade, restrict movement
0 Impose curfew
0 Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions
0 Impose restrictions on political freedoms
0 Impose state of emergency or martial law
0 Increase military alert status
0 Increase police alert status
0 Investigate
0 Investigate crime, corruption
0 Investigate human rights abuses
0 Investigate military action
0 Investigate war crimes
0 Make pessimistic comment
0 Obstruct passage, block
0 Occupy territory
0 Rally opposition against
0 Reduce or break diplomatic relations
0 Reduce or stop economic assistance
0 Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance
0 Reduce or stop material aid
0 Reduce or stop military assistance
0 Reduce relations
0 Refuse to de-escalate military engagement
5
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TABLE A.2: CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT EVENTS 4/4
Violent CAMEO Event Category
0 Refuse to ease administrative sanctions
0 Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
0 Refuse to ease popular dissent
0 Refuse to release persons or property
0 Refuse to yield
0 Reject
0 Reject economic cooperation
0 Reject judicial cooperation
0 Reject material cooperation
0 Reject mediation
0 Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute
0 Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate
0 Reject request for change in institutions, regime
0 Reject request for change in leadership
0 Reject request for economic aid
0 Reject request for military aid
0 Reject request for military protection or peacekeeping
0 Reject request for rights
0 Threaten
0 Threaten non-force
0 Threaten to halt negotiations
0 Threaten to impose curfew
0 Threaten to reduce or break relations
0 Threaten to reduce or stop aid
0 Threaten with administrative sanctions
0 Threaten with military force
0 Threaten with political dissent, protest
0 Threaten with repression
0 Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms
0 Threaten with sanctions, boycott, embargo
0 Use as human shield
0 Veto
0 Violate ceasefire
Notes. Sources: Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset. Cases selected by the authors.
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TABLE A.3: ECONOMIC OUTPUT AFTER PTAS
Luminosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] 0.08534*** 0.24431*** 0.24536*** 0.17928*** 0.22457***
(0.00399) (0.00404) (0.00451) (0.00702) (0.01075)
Constant 1.41793*** 1.18330*** 1.22440*** 1.42061*** 1.43770***
(0.00351) (0.00395) (0.00402) (0.00349) (0.01424)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 444,562
R2 0.06434 0.06858 0.09369 0.06494 0.10849
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell level.
e is the export exposure in municipality i in time t. The dependent variable is luminosity. Sources: Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and
DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.4: ECONOMIC OUTPUT AFTER PTAS
Luminosity (Ln+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] -0.00495*** 0.04431*** 0.04479*** 0.00200 0.01304***
(0.00074) (0.00104) (0.00112) (0.00134) (0.00265)
Constant 1.92186*** 1.66960*** 1.66907*** 1.92223*** 1.89731***
(0.00122) (0.00099) (0.00096) (0.00122) (0.00453)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 951,315 951,315 939,207 951.315 95,329
R2 0.50553 0.27362 0.28716 0.50564 0.53835
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell level.
e is the export exposure in municipality i in time t. The dependent variable is the log of luminosity (only strictly positive values).
Sources: Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and DMSP-OLS).
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TABLE A.5: ECONOMIC OUTPUT AFTER PTAS BY COUNTRY
VARIABLES Algeria Cambodia Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Rep.
e 0.09*** 0.00 0.005*** 0.02 -0.00
(0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.012)
Egypt El Salvador Guatemala Honduras India
e 1.42*** 0.00 -0.01 0.04*** 0.08***
(0.117) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Indonesia Jordan Laos Lebanon Malaysia
e 0.02*** 0.25*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.09***
(0.001) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021) (0.006)
Mexico Morocco Myanmar Nicaragua Panama
e 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Peru Philippines South Africa Thailand Vietnam
e -0.01*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.16***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln(Luminosity)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell
level. e is the export exposure in municipality i in time t. The dependent variable is the log of luminosity. Sources: Desta,
GAEZ Version 3, and DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.6: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AFTER PTAS
Violence (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] 0.00053*** 0.00199*** 0.00191*** 0.00131*** 0.00179***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00015) (0.00036)
Constant 0.00236*** 0.00315*** 0.00319*** 0.00238*** 0.00225***
(0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00055)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 444,562
R2 0.00278 0.00781 0.00989 0.00281 0.01174
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell level.
e is the export exposure in cell i in time t. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that scores one if a cell has positive values
of violent episodes. Sources: Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.7: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AFTER PTAS
Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] 0.00469 0.02382*** 0.02753*** 0.01327 0.03618*
(0.00643) (0.00712) (0.00817) (0.00952) (0.02118)
Constant 0.01862*** 0.02083** 0.02173** 0.01888*** 0.00812
(0.00708) (0.00888) (0.00923) (0.00707) (0.02347)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 4,445,620 444,562
R2 0.00013 0.00035 0.00063 0.00013 0.00985
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell
level. e is the export exposure in cell i in time t. The dependent variable is the count of violent episodes. Sources: Desta, GAEZ
Version 3, and DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.8: ECONOMIC OUTPUT AFTER PTAS BY COUNTRY
VARIABLES Algeria Cambodia Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Rep.
e -0.002*** 0.00 0.001** 0.01** 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
Egypt El Salvador Guatemala Honduras India
e 0.14*** 0.02** 0.005* 0.00 0.02***
(0.051) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Indonesia Jordan Laos Lebanon Malaysia
e 0.001** 0.03*** 0.00 0.06 0.01***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.050) (0.002)
Mexico Morocco Myanmar Nicaragua Panama
e 0.002*** 0.001* 0.00 -0.00 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Peru Philippines South Africa Thailand Vietnam
e -0.0003** 0.09*** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln(Violence)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell
level. e is the export exposure in municipality i in time t. The dependent variable is the log of political violence. Sources:
Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.9: ECONOMIC OUTPUT AFTER PTAS – SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
Luminosity (Ln+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] -0.00496*** 0.00324*** 0.00467*** 0.00609*** 0.00557***
(0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00057) (0.00116) (0.00163)
Constant 0.21706*** 0.21655*** 0.22585*** 0.21706*** 0.21442***
(0.00099) (0.00079) (0.00082) (0.00099) (0.00382)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 1,661,740 1,661,740 1,560,945 1,661,740 165,858
R2 0.03160 0.04079 0.04259 0.03194
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell level.
e is the export exposure in cell i in time t. The dependent variable is the log of luminosity. Sources: Desta, GAEZ Version 3, and
DMSP-OLS.
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TABLE A.10: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AFTER PTAS – SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
Violence (Ln+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E [export exposure] 0.00442*** 0.00453*** 0.00338*** 0.00579*** 0.00434***
(0.00046) (0.00047) (0.00043) (0.00115) (0.00107)
Constant 0.00364*** 0.00461*** 0.00438*** 0.00364*** 0.00399***
(0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00029) (0.00027) (0.00137)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No Yes No No
Grid-specific trends No No Yes No
Spatial lags No No No Yes No
Country-year FE No No No No Yes
No. of obs. 1,749,200 1,749,200 1,643,100 1,749,200 174,920
R2 0.00355 0.00983 0.01325 0.00359 0.01358
Notes. (* p-value< 0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01) Standard errors in parenthesis. Unit of observation is the cell level. e
is the export exposure in cell i in time t. The dependent variable is the log of the count of violent episodes. Sources: Desta, GAEZ
Version 3, and DMSP-OLS.
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